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Abstract: - Attack attribution in cyber-attacks tends to be a qualitative exercise with a substantial room for 
error. Graph theory is already a proven tool for modeling any connected system. Utilizing graph theory can 
provide a quantitative, mathematically rigorous methodology for attack attribution. By identifying 
homomorphic subgraphs as points of comparison, one can create a fingerprint of an attack. That would allow 
one to match that fingerprint to new attacks and determine if the same threat actor conducted the attack. This 
current study provides a mathematical method to create network intrusion fingerprints by applying graph theory 
homomorphisms. This provides a rigorous method for attack attribution. A case study is used to test this 
methodology and determine its efficacy in identifying attacks perpetrated by the same threat actor and/or using 
the same threat vector. 
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1 Introduction 
Network intrusions come in many different 
varieties. There are Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, 
malware infections, remote access, and others. One 
type of intrusion is the remote attacker who attempts 
to obtain confidential data. Unlike Denial of Service 
or botnet attacks, the goal is the exfiltration of data, 
rather than the damage or the disruption of the target 
system [1].  Spyware is delivered to the target 
machine and the data is ex-filtrated. Spyware can be 
used by anyone but is certainly a tool utilized in 
cyber espionage [2] [3].  
One thing that all cyber-attacks have in common 
is the difficulty of attribution. Attribution in cyber-
attacks is always problematic [4] [5]. It is difficult to 
determine who actually the perpetrator was. Unlike 
physical crimes, one cannot use fingerprints, fibre 
evidence, footprints, security camera footage, or 
similar sources of evidence.  The problem is 
exacerbated in nation state scenarios [6] [7]. Nation 
state attacks tend to be sophisticated and the 
perpetrators adept at covering their identity.  
What is needed is a mechanism for developing a 
fingerprint for spyware attacks. A methodology for 
analysing a particular spyware attack and comparing 
it to other attacks. The level of match between the 
attacks can point to a common attacker being 
responsible.  
Graph theory provides a tool that is appropriate 
for developing a fingerprint of spyware activity. It 
has been utilized frequently to model network 
behaviour [8] [9], economics [10], chemical 
engineering [11] and a host of other phenomena. 
Graph theory has already been utilized to model 
digital attacks in by matching indicators of 
compromise on a system wide basis [12]. Algebraic 
graph theory has also been utilized to model 
network intrusions and better understand the attack 
[13][14].  
Cyber attack attribution is not as clear as 
physical forensics. In the physical forensics arena 
one can rely on fingerprints, DNA evidence, hair 
and fiber evidence, and a wide variety of other 
physical markers.  Identifying Indicators of 
Compromise in cyber attacks attempts to provide 
some of this level of rigor but falls short.  What is 
needed in the domain of cyber investigations is 
something that is the equivalent in rigor with a 
fingerprint.  This would move cyber attack 
attribution from a subjective, qualitative process to 
an objective, quantitative science. 
 
 
2 Problem Formulation  
There is a need for improved cyber-attack 
attribution. Attribution of attacks is often done in an 
informal manner that is purely qualitative [15]. This 
is even more challenging in cyber warfare scenarios 
due to threat actors actively obfuscating the origin 
of the attack [16]. What is needed is a rigorous 
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mathematical methodology to analyze and model 
attacks, then to utilize that model as a comparison 
for attribution.  The ability to mathematically assign 
a probability that the same threat actor as a known 
attack executed a given attack that is currently being 
analyzed, would enhance threat attribution.  
In order to understand the current problem, it is 
useful to examine current attack modeling and 
attribution tools. One prominent current model is the 
MITRE Corporation ATT&CK model. This model’s 
name is an acronym for Adversarial Tactics, 
Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK). 
The concept of this particular modeling technique 
was created by the MITRE Corporation.  The 
ATT&CK model documents the specific tactics as 
well as the particular techniques that an adversary 
uses in an attack [17]. This model is widely used 
and can be quite effective in gaining a general 
understanding of an attack. However, the ATT&CK 
method has some limitations.  ATT&CK is formally 
designed to understand the attack vectors, actors, 
and methodologies. The model is not designed to 
fingerprint a given attack for comparison to other 
attacks. The ATT&CK methodology helps the 
analyst to understand how a specific attack was 
conducted but is only moderately useful for attack 
attribution. It does not adequately integrate the 
attack path, or the target network into its model. 
While useful, this methodology actually highlights a 
gap in the literature, that the current study proposes 
to fill. 
Another popular approach to analyzing cyber-
attacks is the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System(CVSS). CVSS is a qualitative mechanism to 
score information-security vulnerabilities. The 
CVSS' numerical score reflects the severity of 
exploits using descriptions such as low, medium, 
high, and critical [18]. The scoring is designed to 
aid in vulnerability management process. There are 
three groups of metrics: base, temporal, and 
environmental. The base group describes the basic 
characteristics of the vulnerability that are not 
determined by time (temporal) or environment.  The 
metrics in this group are Attack Vector, Attack 
Complexity, Privileges Required, User Interaction, 
Scope, Confidentiality Impact, Integrity Impact, and 
Availability Impact. The temporal group of metrics 
describes the time required for the vulnerability to 
be exploited.  The environmental metrics describe 
how the attack is realized, such as over a remote 
connection, local network,  or direct physical access 
[19]. 
While CVSS is an effective tool for analyzing 
vulnerabilities, it is less useful in threat attribution. 
It is certainly possible to relate a CVSS score to an 
actual intrusion. Such an analysis would provide 
some limited insight into the attack vector the threat 
actor used. However, the CVSS process was not 
designed for threat attribution and is not effective in 
that application. 
In addition to general attack modeling methods, 
there are methods for documenting Indicators of 
Compromise (IoC).  Any attack will be detected via 
one or more IoC’s.  Thus, documenting and 
communicating such IoC’s in a formal manner is of 
great importance.  Three of the most widely used 
IoC methods are STIX, TAXII, and CybOx [20] 
[21] [22]. These methods are effective in 
documenting and communicating specific, 
individual IoC’s. However, by themselves, these 
methods do not provide a robust method of attack 
attribution. 
Another threat modeling technique is Visual, 
Agile, Simple, Threat Modeling (VAST). This 
threat modeling method is used to enumerate and 
prioritize threats. VAST is focused on software 
threat modeling, particularly in Agile programming 
[23]. VAST works with two concurrent types of 
models. The application threat model and the 
operational threat model.  Threats are reviewed from 
both perspectives. Process flow diagrams are used to 
examine application threats. Data flow diagrams are 
used to examine operational threats [24]. While 
useful in analyzing software vulnerabilities, this 
methodology is not applicable to general cyber-
attacks, nor to attack attribution. 
What a review of the current literature 
demonstrates, is that there is a gap in the literature. 
There are numerous methods for evaluating 
vulnerabilities, analyzing cyber-attacks, and 
describing indicators of compromise. What is 
currently lacking is a reliable attack attribution 
methodology. Such a methodology must be reliable, 
and thus should be based on well-established, 
rigorous mathematics. 
 
 
3 Problem Solution 
 
As was previously discussed in this paper, graph 
theory provides a robust modeling tool that has been 
applied to a wide range of problem domains. The 
solution proposed in this paper is to utilize graph 
auto-morphisms in order to both fully understand 
the parameters of a given attack, and to compare the 
attack against other attacks to determine attribution. 
 
Our approach to this problem starts with a complete 
equivalence of two graphs, an isomorphism. A 
simple definition of isomorphism between two 
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graphs is if both graphs have the same number of 
vertices, the same number of edges, and identical 
degree matrices. While these conditions are 
necessary for isomorphism, they are not sufficient.  
For instance, consider two graphs Va and Vb. The 
added requirement is that a vertex function f from 
Va and Vb preserves both adjacency and non-
adjacency values. Essentially this requires that the 
two graphs have not only identical vertex sets, edge 
sets, and degree matrices, but that their structure is 
retained. Put more formally there must exist a 
structure-preserving vertex bijection f: Va -> Vb in 
order for these two graphs to be isomorphic [25].  
Even two attacks executed by the same threat actor 
using the same attack vector are unlikely to be 
isomorphic. This is due to the target systems having 
different structure and data flow.  
Graph homomorphisms are better suited to attack 
attribution. A graph homomorphism is a structure 
preserving mapping between two graphs. If it is a 
directed graph, even the origins and tails of arcs are 
preserved [26].  Put a bit more formally, and 
referring to directed graphs: 
 
Let G1 = (V1, E1, o1, t1) and G2 = (V2, E2, o2, t2) 
Where Vx is the set of vertices in the graph, Ex is the 
set of edges, ox is the origin of the arcs, and tx is the 
tail. 
θv: V1 -> V2 
θE: E1 -> E2 
 
Such that the origins and tails maintain their 
structure for all e ε E, this is a strong 
homomorphism.  
 
This may sound quite similar to an isomorphism; 
and it is true that a strong graph homomorphism, 
that is also bijective, is an isomorphism. However, 
there are variations of graph homomorphisms.  
 
A weak homomorphism, also called a graph 
egamorphism [27] has the same edge set, but not 
necessarily the same origin to tail relationship. Put 
more formally, an egamorphism is a relationship for 
G1 and G2 such that: 
if (a,b) ε E and f(a) ≠ f(b)   
 
 
Thus, one tool available with mapping a network 
intrusion is to determine if the attacks form an 
egamorphism. Of course, one would check to see if 
the attacks are isomorphic, but that is highly 
improbable. 
 
The next area to explore, when comparing two 
attacks, is to consider induced subgraphs. In general, 
terms an induced subgraph is formed form a subset 
of the vertices of another graph with the edges 
connecting the vertices in that subset.  Put more 
formally if G = (V, E) and S ⊂ V of G, then a graph 
H whose vertex set is S and which includes all of 
the edges that have both endpoints in S is an 
induced subset of G [28].  Induced subgraphs are 
important in examining network intrusions. If one 
treats the affected devices as an induced subset of 
the network graph, one can compare the induced 
subset from another attack to analyze similarities in 
attack vectors, targets, and other aspects of the 
incident.  
 
It is also advantageous to examine the neighborhood 
of any vertex that is identified as being relevant to 
the attack in question. A neighborhood of vertex v in 
a graph G is a subgraph of G induced by all vertices 
adjacent to v [29]. It is clear that multiple induced 
subgraphs will be found by studying the 
neighborhood of vertices of interest in a given 
attack. 
 
The process begins with creating a graph model of 
the two attacks. Then the graphs are analyzed to see 
if they are isomorphic or egamorphic. Either of 
which would be a strong indicator of identical threat 
actors using the same threat vector on similar target 
networks. Certainly, isomorphic graphs demonstrate 
that the exact same attack was used, with the same 
threat vector, on a substantially similar network 
topology. That could only occur with an identical 
attacker. Egamorphic graphs are not entirely 
identical as isomorphic graphs are but have enough 
overlap to clearly point to the same threat actor. 
Assuming that the induced graphs are neither 
isomorphic or egamorphic, the next portion of the 
analysis is to identify induced subgraphs that are 
homomorphic (even weakly homomorphic) and 
analyze those. Particular attention should be paid to 
the neighborhood induced graphs of key vertices in 
both attacks.  
 
Of particular interest would be the state wherein the 
neighborhood induced subgraph of G is a covering 
graph of a neighborhood induced subgraph of H. A 
covering graph is a covering map from the vertex 
set of G to H. More formally, a covering map is a 
surjection and an isomorphism. It is even more 
relevant to comparing two attacks if the graphs are 
multigraphs. A covering graph of two induced sub-
multigraphs is a strong indicator of identical threat 
actors and attack vectors.  
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Each induced subgraph that represents a 
homomorphism would be a point of match between 
the two attacks. This provides a method that is 
analogous to fingerprints. In fingerprint analysis, 
points of similarity are identified. The more 
matching points between fingerprints, the strong the 
identification is considered to be [30] [31].  
 
The strength of the relationship in the induced 
subgraphs would be weighted, such that an 
isomorphism is weighted more than a weak 
homomorphism. A proposed weighting is shown in 
table 1. 
 
Table 1 Relationship Weighting 
Weight Relationship 
3 Isomorphism 
2 Strong homomorphism 
1 
Weak homomorphism/ 
egamorphism 
 
It should be obvious that the weighting is relevant to 
the total size of the graph. If one has two graphs, 
each of only four vertices, three of which form an 
isomorphic subgraph yielding a very strong match. 
However, the same three vertices from each graph 
forming an isomorphic subgraph, when the entirety 
of each graph is 100 vertices, is not a very strong 
relationship. Therefore, the degree of similarity is 
calculated by the weight divided by the total number 
of vertices. This is shown in equation 1. 
𝜃 =
𝑤
𝑇𝑣
 (1) 
 
The degree of matching is represented by the theta 
symbol θ.  The w represents total weight assigned to 
subgraphs multiplied by 2. This is done because 
each original graph contains an induced subgraph 
that is being compared to an induced subgraph in 
the other complete graph. The Vt are the total 
number of vertices in the two graphs.  This is 
normally described as the combined order of the two 
graphs. This produces a number between 0 and 1, 
quantifying the similarity. Given the fact that 
networks can be very different, one would expect 
relatively low values for θ.  Values even above 0.25 
would be considered strong matches. 
 
 
3.1 A Case Study 
In order to test this fingerprinting process, a 
comparative experiment was conducted.  Two 
different virtual systems were breached. In both 
cases the same attack vector was used, by the same 
threat actor. However, the individual virtual 
environments were different. In these case studies, 
directed graphs are utilized. The arrow points from 
the origin of the communications, towards the target 
of communications. 
 
In virtual environment 1, a Windows 7 virtual 
machine was connected to the internet and internally 
connected to a Windows 2012 server running SQL 
Server 2008. There was also a Windows 10 
computer that was hardened with very few services 
running on it. There were two other Windows 10 
virtual machines that were not scanned or breached. 
However, these machines were connected to the 
Windows 2012 server, specifically to the SQL 
Server database. 
 
In virtual environment 2, a Windows 10 virtual 
machine was connected to the internet, and 
internally connected to a Windows 2019 server and 
an Ubuntu Linux web server running Apache.  
There were also three Windows 10 virtual machines 
that were not scanned or breached. However, these 
machines were connected to the Apache web server. 
 
In both cases, the internet computer was sent a 
malicious payload using the Kali Linux msfvenom 
tool [32].  The payload was disguised as a PDF file 
and was sent as an attachment to an email. Upon 
clicking the file, it was designed to create an HTTPS 
reverse shell back to the listening Kali machine.  
The payload for the virtual environment 2 was 
obfuscated using architecture modifications and 
encryption [33]. 
 
Once a tunnel was established, the attacking 
machine attempted to determine other targets in the 
network, and to pivot to those machines. In virtual 
environment 1, the attack was able to successfully 
log on to the Windows 2012 server, but not the 
hardened Windows 10 computer.  In virtual 
environment 2, the attacker attempted to connect to 
both the Windows server 2019 and the Ubuntu web 
server but was not able to breach the target system.  
In both virtual environments, the attempts to breach 
secondary machines were preceded by identical 
metasploit scans. 
 
Virtual environment 1, is depicted as a graph in 
figure 1. 
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 Fig. 1: The graph of virtual environment 1 
The vertices in figure 1 are described in table 2. 
Table 2 Virtual Environment 1 
Vertex Description 
A 
Kali Linux attack virtual 
machine 
B Wndows 7 virtual machine 
C Windows server 2012 
D 
Hardened Windows 10  vritual 
system 
E Windows 10 virtual system 
F Windows 10 virtual system 
 
The directionality of the arcs indicates 
communication initiated from the origin to the tail. 
If a breach is made, then there is communication 
from the target, to the attack machine.  
 
Virtual environment 2, is depicted as a graph in 
figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2 : The graph of virtual environment 2 
 
The vertices in figure 2 are described in table 3. 
Table 2 Virtual Environment 2 
Vertex Description 
A 
Kali Linux attack virtual 
machine 
B Wndows 10 virtual machine 
C 
Windows server 2019 virtual 
machine 
D 
Ubuntu – Apache virtual 
machine 
E Windows 10 virtual system 
F Windows 10 virtual system 
G Windows 10 virtual system 
 
As is expected, the two environments are different.  
In this scenario, the vertices A, B, C, and D do form 
an induced subgraph. This is depicted in figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3: Induced subgraph 
The dotted line from vertex C to B represents the 
one arc present in one induced subgraph but not the 
other.  One good further divide this into two induced 
subgraphs.  The A-B-D subgraph is isomorphic in 
both virtual environments.  The A-B-C subgraph is 
not, due to the arc present in one environment and 
not the other. However, the A-B-C subgraph is a 
weak homomorphism.  
 
Using the weighting previously discussed in table 1, 
the two attacks have a match weighted at 4. This 
represents a 3 for the isomorphism + 1 for the weak 
homomorphism.  Using equation 1, previously 
described, would provide a matching score of 𝜃 =
8
13
  which is .615. 
 
In this case study, it is already known that the two 
attacks were carried out by the same threat actor, 
using the same attack vector, and the same entry 
point. Thus, it is expected that the level of similarity 
would be high.  However, it is necessary to compare 
this against an attack that was not done with the 
same attack vector.  
The third experiment utilized virtual environment 2, 
with one change. In this case the attack was not with 
an MSFVenom package delivered via email, but 
rather an Excel spreadsheet with a malicious macro 
embedded and uploaded to a web server. The target 
machines were all sent a link encouraging them to 
download the attachment. 
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Table 3 Virtual Environment 1 Attack 2 
Vertex Description 
A 
Kali Linux attack virtual 
machine 
B Web Server for malicious file 
C Wndows 10 virtual machine 
D 
Windows server 2019 virtual 
machine 
E 
Ubuntu – Apache virtual 
machine 
F Windows 10 virtual system 
H Windows 10 virtual system 
H Windows 10 virtual system 
 
Machines F and H did open the malicious 
spreadsheet initiating a connection back to machine 
A.  The graph produced by this attack is shown in 
figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Virtual Environment 2-Attack 2 
Even though the initial attack machine is the same, 
and the target network is the same, even an 
elementary visual comparison of the graph in figure 
4 verses the graph in figure 2 are clearly quite 
different.  Now the two graphs are compared to seek 
out any homomorphic, non-trivial subgraphs. In 
scenario 3, the attacking machines are a and b. 
Vertex b did not exist in scenario 2, and in scenario 
2, and vertex a only connected directly to B and C. 
This leads to a situation wherein there only one 
induced subgraph including an attacking machine, 
shown in figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Virtual Environment 2-Attack 2- 
subgraph 
As this subgraph does not retain the head-tail 
relationship, it is egamorphic. That provides 
matching score of  𝜃 =
1
15
  which is 0.0666. 
 
Thus, when two attacks involve the same attack 
vector, the same methodology, on very similar 
networks, the θ value was 0.615.  When two attacks 
use a completely different attack vector and 
methodology, even on identical networks, the θ 
value was θ value was 0.615.  Thus, the θ value 
from analyzing homomorphic induced subgraphs 
was effective in attack attribution and can provide a 
digital fingerprint for cyber-attacks. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
In this study a methodology was proposed and 
tested with case studies. That method utilized 
homomorphisms of induced subgraphs provides a 
method that is equivalent to biological fingerprint 
matching. The various points (i.e. subgraphs) are 
compared to determine how many matching points 
exist in the two graphs.  This allows a network 
intrusion wherein the threat actor and attack vector 
are known to be compared to an unknown attack to 
aid in attack attribution. The method outlined in the 
current study improves threat attribution to a 
quantifiable, mathematically precise practice.   
 
More work in this area is recommended. The most 
obvious avenue for further research would be 
additional case studies involving known attacks.  It 
may also be advantages to explore additional points 
of comparison including weightings and incidence 
functions.  It may also be advantageous to explore 
additional levels of homomorphisms such as quasi-
strong homomorphisms and locally strong 
homomorphisms. 
 
Yet another area of possible extension for this 
current study is to explore variations in graph 
theory. Fractional graphs deal with non-integer 
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values and may be applicable to network attacks. 
Fuzzy graph theory integrates non-binary logic into 
graph theory. Both fractional graph theory and fuzzy 
graph theory are areas that should be explored in 
reference to the current study. 
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